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i. intrOdUCtiOn
 Analysts play an important role in the securities markets.1 By providing coverage 
on a security, they substantially enhance visibility to the investing public.2 Research 
reports help to increase market efficiency and integrity.3 But the information analysts 
provide and the research they conduct are costly.4 Because of the nature of their 
services and the ease in which the information they produce can become a public 
good, analysts have difficulty funding their research.5 They have few choices other 
than to rely on investment banks, brokerage firms, and financial institutions for 
financial support.6 The consequence of forming arrangements to subsidize their 
research is that conflicts of interest become unavoidable, particularly when funding 
is linked to the success of the subsidizer’s business.7 For example, an analyst’s favorable 
report on an initial public offering of a new security underwritten by his or her 
investment-bank-employer can boost the new security’s hype and increase the 
employer’s sales.8 Similarly, optimistic buy recommendations issued by an analyst 
employed by a brokerage firm can increase the employer’s customer trading volume 
and generate commissions.9 These relationships create incentives that can affect an 
analyst’s choice of which securities to cover, whether to issue a buy or sell 
recommendation, and how optimistic such a recommendation should be.10
 Analysts then become a target in securities fraud litigation for their stock 
recommendations and ratings. Investors have brought numerous class actions to 
recover losses they allege they suffered as a result of misleading recommendations 
published by analysts.11 Analysts who publicly make a material misstatement that are 
1. DeMarco v. Lehman Bros., 222 F.R.D. 243, 246 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
2. Jill E. Fisch, Does Analyst Independence Sell Investors Short?, 55 UCLA L. Rev. 39, 46 (2007).
3. Id.
4. Id. at 48.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. See Harold S. Bloomenthal, Sarbanes-Oxley Act in Perspective § 9:2 (2010–2011 ed. 2010).
8. See id.
9. See id.
10. See Fisch, supra note 2, at 56.
11. See, e.g., Millowitz v. Citigroup Global Mkts., Inc. (In re Salomon Analyst Metromedia Litig.), 544 F.3d 
474 (2d Cir. 2008); Miles v. Merrill Lynch & Co., 471 F.3d 24 (2d Cir. 2006); Hevesi v. Citigroup Inc., 
366 F.3d 70 (2d Cir. 2004); Fogarazzo v. Lehman Bros., 263 F.R.D. 90 (S.D.N.Y. 2009); In re 
Healthsouth Corp. Sec. Litig., 257 F.R.D. 260 (N.D. Ala. 2009); In re Credit Suisse First Bos. Corp. 
(Lantronix, Inc.) Analyst Sec. Litig., 250 F.R.D. 137 (S.D.N.Y. 2008); In re Credit Suisse-AOL Sec. 
Litig., 253 F.R.D. 17 (D. Mass. 2008); 60223 Trust v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., 540 F. Supp. 2d 449 
(S.D.N.Y. 2007); In re Enron Corp. Sec., 529 F. Supp. 2d 644 (S.D. Tex. 2006); DeMarco v. Robertson 
Stephens Inc., 228 F.R.D. 468 (S.D.N.Y. 2005); LaGrasta v. First Union Sec., Inc., No. 2:01-CV-251-
FTM29DNF, 2005 WL 1875469 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 8, 2005); Swack v. Credit Suisse First Bos., 230 
F.R.D. 250 (D. Mass. 2005); DeMarco v. Lehman Bros., 222 F.R.D. 243 (S.D.N.Y. 2004); In re Merrill 
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relied upon by and cause losses to investors should pay damages.12 However, analysts 
should not be held liable if investors would have purchased the stock regardless of 
whether the alleged misstatement was known.13 Nonetheless, by applying the fraud-
on-the-market presumption of reliance to actions brought against research analysts, 
federal courts have provided investors greater leverage to recover from analysts even 
when the misstatement had no effect on investors’ investment decisions.14
 “Reliance provides the requisite causal connection between a defendant’s 
misrepresentation and a plaintiff ’s injury.”15 To establish a cause of action for fraud, a 
plaintiff must show that he or she relied on the alleged misconduct.16 The purpose of 
the reliance element is to certify that the defendant actually caused the plaintiff ’s 
injury.17 If the plaintiff would have acted differently had the truth been known, there 
has been reliance.18 For example, even if a person intentionally made a fraudulent and 
misleading misstatement to an investor who buys a stock, reliance cannot be 
established if the investor would have purchased the stock had he or she known the 
truth. The investor cannot recover any loss based on the misstatement. Absent the 
reliance requirement, an investor could, in effect, use the court system as an insurance 
against investment losses.19
 Proving reliance becomes problematic when investors file class-action lawsuits 
for securities fraud against publicly held companies.20 For a class action to proceed in 
federal court, the case must be certified by a court. The class must satisfy the 
requirements for certification under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 (“Rule 23”).21 
In a class action for damages, Rule 23 requires that questions of law or fact common 
to the members of the class predominate over any questions affecting only individual 
members.22 To establish a claim for fraud, a class must prove reliance on the 
misrepresentation.23 However, if a class were to show that each member relied on the 
Lynch & Co., 273 F. Supp. 2d 351 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); In re Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative & ERISA 
Litig., 235 F. Supp. 2d 549 (S.D. Tex. 2002).
12. See, e.g., Millowitz, 544 F.3d at 481.
13. See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 248–49 (1988).
14. See Millowitz, 544 F.3d 474; In re Credit Suisse-AOL, 253 F.R.D. at 28; In re Bos. Scientific Corp. Sec. 
Litig., 604 F. Supp. 2d 275, 286 (D. Mass. 2009).
15. Millowitz, 544 F.3d at 480–81 (quoting Basic, 485 U.S. at 243) (internal quotation mark omitted).
16. See id.
17. List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457, 462 (2d Cir. 1965).
18. See Gariety v. Grant Thorton LLP, 368 F.3d 356, 367 (4th Cir. 2004).
19. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 252 (1988) (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); 
cf. Gariety, 368 F.3d at 367.
20. Basic, 485 U.S at 242.
21. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23.
22. Id.
23. See Basic, 485 U.S. at 243.
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misrepresentation, individual issues would predominate over the commonality of the 
class and defeat certification.
 To fill this gap, the U.S. Supreme Court in Basic Inc. v. Levinson established a 
presumption based on the economic fraud-on-the-market theory.24 Under this 
doctrine, investors are presumed to rely on a material misrepresentation publicly 
made about a stock that trades in an efficient market.25 The assumption is that all 
public information is incorporated into the stock price.26 Thus, a public misstatement 
that affects the price will also affect the decisions of investors relying on that price, 
even if the investors were not aware of the misstatement at the time.27 Since Basic, 
courts have presumed reliance in class-action lawsuits filed by investors against the 
companies and executives for misrepresentation and reckless disclosure.28
 Recently, federal courts have extended the presumption beyond the context in 
Basic.29 Although Basic was a class action brought by investors against a company and 
its executives for misrepresentation, courts have taken the position that the application 
of the presumption in class actions against research analysts and other non-issuers 
should be no different.30 While acknowledging that statements made by analysts 
qualitatively and inherently differ from those made by publicly held companies, these 
courts came to this conclusion without assessing whether the information published 
24. Id. at 247. The Supreme Court has found a rebuttable presumption of reliance in two circumstances. 
Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 159 (2008). The Basic Court 
established a rebuttable presumption of reliance in the context where the misstatements in issue become 
public. Id. The second context where a rebuttable presumption of reliance will apply is where a defendant 
owes an investor a duty to disclose and breaches that duty by making a misstatement or omission of 
material fact. Id. The aggrieved investor in such an instance need not provide specific proof of reliance. 
Id.; see Affiliated Ute Citizens of Utah v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 153 (1972).
25. Basic, 485 U.S. at 241.
26. Id. at 244.
27. Joseph M. McLaughlin, McLaughlin on Class Actions § 5:26 (6th ed. 2009).
28. See Edward Brodsky & M. Patricia Adamski, Law of Corporate Officers and Directors: 
Rights, Duties and Liabilities § 12:18 (2009).
29. See, e.g., Millowitz v. Citigroup Global Mkts., Inc. (In re Salomon Analyst Metromedia Litig.), 544 F.3d 
474, 481 (2d Cir. 2008) (holding that it “does not matter, for purposes of establishing entitlement to the 
presumption, whether the misinformation was transmitted by an issuer, an analyst, or anyone else”); 
Miles v. Merrill Lynch & Co. (In re Initial Pub. Offering Sec. Litig.), 471 F.3d 24, 43 (2d Cir. 2006) 
(“It is also doubtful whether the Basic presumption can be extended, beyond its original context, to 
tie-in trading, underwriter compensation, and analysts’ reports.” (emphasis added)); Hevesi v. Citigroup 
Inc., 366 F.3d 70 (2d Cir. 2004) (holding that the fraud-on-the-market doctrine under Basic extends to 
opinions expressed by research analysts); In re Credit Suisse First Bos. Corp. (Lantronix, Inc.) Analyst 
Sec. Litig., 250 F.R.D. 137, 139 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (holding that the presumption of reliance might apply 
to research analysts, but not deciding the issue); In re Credit Suisse-AOL Sec. Litig., 253 F.R.D. 17 (D. 
Mass. 2008) (declining to adopt a higher class-certification standard for research analyst cases); 
DeMarco v. Robertson Stephens Inc., 228 F.R.D. 468, 475 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (same); LaGrasta v. First 
Union Sec., Inc., No. 2:01-CV-251-FTM29DNF, 2005 WL 1875469 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 8, 2005) 
(recognizing generally that “reliance may be presumed where securities are traded on the open market”); 
DeMarco v. Lehman Bros., 222 F.R.D. 243, 245 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (concluding “that the fraud-on-the-
market doctrine may in certain conditions apply to analyst reports”).
30. See Millowitz, 544 F.3d 474; In re Credit Suisse-AOL, 253 F.R.D. 17; Robertson Stephens, 228 F.R.D.at 475.
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in research reports can affect the price of a stock.31 Statements made by issuers, who 
owe a general duty to investors and must abide by U.S. Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) disclosure regulations, are authoritative, relatively certain, and 
highly likely to be relied upon by investors.32 On the contrary, recommendations 
made by analysts, who do not have a general duty to the market, are statements of 
opinion, subjective, uncertain, and likely to dissipate among the sea of opinions on 
the particular stock.33 The market may also discount or disregard information 
emanated from analysts in consideration of potential conflicts of interest that are 
common in the financial research industry.34 Thus, even if plaintiffs can show the 
Basic standard is met, the market may not incorporate the allegedly misleading 
information into the price. If incorporation does not occur, the misstatement does 
not affect the market price, and reliance should not be presumed.
 By certifying a class nonetheless, the courts have bypassed the reliance requirement 
and failed to adhere to federal law.35 Every investor who owned the stock after the 
alleged misrepresentation was made and held the stock until after the truth was 
revealed has a cause of action for loss.36 Due process concerns of defendants inherent 
in class certification are magnified and unaddressed by such application because it 
results in an imbalanced allocation of the parties’ evidentiary burden that unfairly 
gives the plaintiffs the upper hand.37 Justice White’s suspicion expressed in Basic that 
the fraud-on-the-market presumption would “lead to large judgments, payable in the 
last analysis by innocent investors, for the benefit of speculators and their lawyers” 
will materialize.38 Even if a judgment is not reached, the pressure on defendants to 
settle becomes extreme because class certification will fail to prevent plaintiffs from 
“unfairly bully[ing] defendants into settling ‘non-meritorious cases . . . to avoid both 
[the] risk of liability and litigation expense.’”39 The end result for research analysts 
could be an unwarranted chill on their insights and recommendations.
31. See, e.g., In re Credit Suisse-AOL, 253 F.R.D. at 29.
32. See Roberta S. Karmel, When Should Investor Reliance Be Presumed In Securities Class Actions?, 63 Bus. 
Law. 25, 49 (2007); Lehman Bros., 222 F.R.D. at 246. See generally McLaughlin, supra note 27.
33. See Lehman Bros., 222 F.R.D. at 247.
34. See Fisch, supra note 2, at 66.
35. See generally Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 242–43 (1988); Fed. R. Civ. P. 23.
36. See Basic, 485 U.S. at 256 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Karmel, supra note 32, 
at 49. (“[E]xtending the fraud-on-the-market doctrine to statements by third parties, who are not 
required to speak by SEC regulations and do not owe a duty to investors or shareholders, seems to 
encourage too much questionable litgation.”).
37. See id.
38. Id. at 262 (quoting SEC v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 867 (2d Cir. 1968)). Thus far, only 
three cases have applied the presumption beyond class actions against issuers; however, as this note 
contends, this relatively new expansion is likely to lead to increased litigation.
39. In re Credit Suisse-AOL Sec. Litig., 253 F.R.D. 17, 22 (D. Mass. 2008) (quoting Brown v. Am. Honda 
(In re New Motor Vehicles Can. Exp. Antitrust Litig.), 522 F.3d 6, 8 (1st Cir. 2008)).
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 Part II will discuss Basic in further detail, explain the basis of the fraud-on-the-
market theory, and provide the elements of the presumption set out by the U.S. 
Supreme Court. Part III reviews the decisions in which federal courts have extended 
the presumption to research analysts and other secondary parties under the standard 
established by Basic. Part IV discusses why courts should not treat misstatements 
made by research analysts the same as those made by securities issuers. It argues that 
extending the Basic framework to determine whether reliance can be presumed in 
actions against analysts alleging fraud is improper and overly broad. Part V argues 
that plaintiffs should meet a heightened standard and that courts should perform 
deeper inquiry than what Basic required before applying the fraud-on-the-market 
presumption in class actions against analysts. The section explains what the higher 
standard should be and what issues a court should examine to determine if an alleged 
misstatement was incorporated into the market price of a stock. Finally, Part VI 
emphasizes the importance of involving the analysis and work of experts to determine 
whether application of the fraud-on-the-market presumption makes economic sense.
ii. Basic inc. v. Levinson and thE fraUd-On-thE-MarKEt thEOry
 Investors may file a private class action for damages suffered as a result of an 
alleged misstatement or omission of material fact in connection with the purchase or 
sale of a security pursuant to section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 193440 
and Securities Exchange Commission Rule 10b-5.41 Courts recognize that class 
actions are appropriate in securities litigation because it may be the only practical 
means of enforcing the rights of investors, as the claims are often too small to warrant 
litigation.42 Before a class action can proceed, a court must certify the class upon a 
finding that the plaintiffs have satisfied requirements pursuant to Rule 23.43 Courts 
must “rigorously analyze” whether the plaintiffs have satisfied each element of Rule 
23 by resolving relevant factual disputes even if they must make inquiries into the 
merits.44 Rule 23 requires that “questions of law or fact common to the members of 
40. 15 U.S.C. § 78j (2006 & Supp. IV 2010).
41. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2010).
42. E.g., In re Bos. Scientific Corp. Sec. Litig., 604 F. Supp. 2d 275 (D. Mass. 2009).
43. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23.
44. In re Salomon Analyst Metromedia Litig., 236 F.R.D. 208, 211 (S.D.N.Y. 2006); Miles v. Merrill 
Lynch & Co. (In re Initial Pub. Offering Sec. Litig.), 471 F.3d 24, 34 (2d Cir. 2006).
[W]e reach the following conclusions: (1) a district judge may certify a class only after 
making determinations that each of the Rule 23 requirements has been met; (2) such 
determinations can be made only if the judge resolves factual disputes relevant to each 
Rule 23 requirement and finds that whatever underlying facts are relevant to a particular 
Rule 23 requirement have been established and is persuaded to rule, based on the 
relevant facts and the applicable legal standard, that the requirement is met; (3) the 
obligation to make such determinations is not lessened by overlap between a Rule 23 
requirement and a merits issue, even a merits issue that is identical with a Rule 23 
requirement; (4) in making such determinations, a district judge should not assess any 
aspect of the merits unrelated to a Rule 23 requirement; and (5) a district judge has 
1127
nEW yOrK LaW sChOOL LaW rEViEW VOLUME 55 | 2010/11
the class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members.”45 
Satisfying this rule becomes difficult when the investors must show that the question 
of whether plaintiffs in fact relied on the misstatement, a fundamental element in a 
securities fraud claim, can be satisfied as a class.46 In Basic Inc. v. Levinson, the U.S. 
Supreme Court addressed this matter in a class action brought by investors against a 
public company and its directors for issuing misleading public statements.47 The 
Supreme Court acknowledged that requiring evidence of reliance from each 
individual plaintiff on the misrepresentations would prevent the class action from 
proceeding because individual issues would prevail over common ones.48 The Court 
also noted that in today’s modern securities markets, where impersonal transactions 
are the norm, investors face undue difficulties in proving direct reliance.49 The Court 
held that the investors’ reliance on an issuer’s misstatements may be presumed based 
ample discretion to circumscribe both the extent of discovery concerning Rule 23 
requirements and the extent of a hearing to determine whether such requirements are 
met in order to assure that a class certification motion does not become a pretext for a 
partial trial of the merits.
 Id. at 41.
45. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23. Rule 23(b)(3) is satisfied when:
[T]he court finds that the questions of law or fact common to the members of the class 
predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and that a class 
action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of 
the controversy. The matters pertinent to the findings include: (A) the interest of 
members of the class in individually controlling the prosecution or defense of separate 
actions; (B) the extent and nature of any litigation concerning the controversy already 
commenced by or against members of the class; (C) the desirability or undesirability of 
concentrating the litigation of the claims in the particular forum; (D) the difficulties 
likely to be encountered in the management of the class action.
 Id. See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 242 (1988) (“Requiring proof of individualized 
reliance from each member of the proposed plaintiff class effectively would have prevented 
respondents from proceeding with a class action, since individual issues would have 
overwhelmed the common ones.”).
46. See Basic, 485 U.S. at 243 (“Reliance provides the requisite causal connection between a defendant’s 
misrepresentation and a plaintiff ’s injury.”).
The basic elements of a cause of action for securities fraud under § 10(b) and Rule 
10b-5 are (1) material misstatement or omission, (2) scienter, (3) a connection with the 
purchase or sale of a security, (4) reliance, “often referred to in cases involving public 
securities markets (fraud-on-the-market cases) as transaction causation,” (5) economic 
loss, and (6) “loss causation, i.e., a causal connection between the material 
misrepresentation and the loss.”
 Millowitz v. Citigroup Global Mkts., Inc. (In re Salomon Analyst Metromedia Litig.), 544 F.3d 474, 
478 n.1 (2d Cir. 2008) (quoting Dura Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, 554 U.S. 336, 341 (2005)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted).
47. 485 U.S. at 228.
48. Id. at 242.
49. Id. at 243–44; In re Worldcom, Inc. Sec. Litig., 219 F.R.D. 267, 291 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
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upon the fraud-on-the-market theory.50 The theory provides that, in an open and 
well-developed market, the stock price reflects all public information.51 The Court 
reasoned that, when making a decision to trade, many investors do not personally 
review all available information on a publicly held company.52 Instead, investors “rely 
on informed traders and market makers” who digest and incorporate the public 
information into the stock through their trades.53 Thus, when investors rely on the 
price, they rely indirectly on the accuracy of the information disseminated into the 
market.54 The market is the “unpaid agent of the investor, informing him that given 
all the information available to it, the value of the stock is worth the market price.”55 
Public misrepresentations that affect the stock price will then “defraud [stock 
purchasers] even if [they] do not directly rely on the misstatements.”56
 To trigger the presumption, the Court required the plaintiffs to prove the 
defendant: “(1) publicly made (2) a material misrepresentation (3) about stock traded 
on an . . . [efficient] market.”57 The plaintiff had to demonstrate that he or she held 
the shares of the affected stock “between the time the misrepresentation was made 
and the truth was revealed.”58 Once a plaintiff establishes these elements, the 
defendant may rebut the presumption with “[a]ny showing that severs the link 
between the alleged misrepresentation and either the price received (or paid) by the 
plaintiff, or his decision to trade at a fair market price.”59
 In establishing the fraud-on-the-market presumption, the Supreme Court 
specifically dealt with the context of issuers and misrepresentations by corporate 
management.60 Whether the presumption can be applied in actions alleging 
misrepresentation by non-issuers is unclear. In Stoneridge Investment Partners, LLC v. 
Scientific-Atlantic, Inc., the U.S. Supreme Court held that the fraud-on-the-market 
presumption did not apply to a class action brought by investors against entities that 
transacted as suppliers and customers with the investors’ company.61 The investors 
alleged that these entities participated in agreements that allowed the issuer to 
50. Basic, 485 U.S. at 250.
51. Id. at 241.
52. McLaughlin, supra note 27, § 5:26.
53. Id. 
54. DeMarco v. Robertson Stephens Inc., 228 F.R.D. 468, 475 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
55. Basic, 485 U.S. at 244 (quoting In re LTV Sec. Litig., 88 F.R.D. 134, 143 (N.D. Tex. 1980)) (internal 
quotation mark omitted).
56. Id. at 241–42.
57. Millowitz v. Citigroup Global Mkts., Inc. (In re Salomon Analyst Metromedia Litig.), 544 F.3d 474, 
481 (2d Cir. 2008); see also Basic, 485 U.S. at 248.
58. Basic, 485 U.S. at 248 n.27.
59. Id. at 248.
60. Id. at 224.
61. 552 U.S. 148, 152–53 (2008).
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mislead its auditors, misstate its financial statements, and inflate its stock price.62 
The Supreme Court held that the implied private right of action under section 10(b) 
and Rule 10b-5 did not extend to suppliers and customers, who owed no duty to 
disclose their fraudulent transactions with the investor’s company.63 The fraud-on-
the-market presumption did not apply because “their deceptive acts were not 
communicated to the public.”64 Thus, reliance could not be established.65 The 
Supreme Court has not addressed whether the presumption can be extended to 
misrepresentations made by other non-issuers, such as research analysts.66
 In the last decade, investor claims against research analysts for their failure to 
disclose conflicts of interest with the investment banking firms that employed them 
have surged.67 Federal courts are divided on whether the theory should apply to 
research analysts and other non-issuers, as well as on what evidence plaintiffs should 
be required to show prior to being afforded the presumption.68
iii.  EXtEnsiOn Of thE prEsUMptiOn UndEr thE Basic fraMEWOrK tO 
rEsEarCh anaLysts and “anyOnE ELsE”
 Recently, federal courts have held that the fraud-on-the-market theory applies in 
class actions alleging misrepresentation against analysts and other non-issuers.69 Some 
of these courts, including the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, have taken the 
position that, to invoke the presumption in such actions, plaintiffs need merely to 
satisfy the elements set forth in Basic.70 Despite the qualitative differences between 
statements made by issuers and non-issuers, courts have found that the standard 
created for actions against issuers is also appropriate in actions brought against non-
62. Id. 
63. Id. at 159.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. See Millowitz v. Citigroup Global Mkts., Inc. (In re Salomon Analyst Metromedia Litig.), 544 F.3d 474, 
481 (2d Cir. 2008).
67. See, e.g., id.; Ray v. Citigroup Global Mkts., Inc., 482 F.3d 991 (7th Cir. 2007); Hevesi v. Citigroup Inc., 
366 F.3d 70, 73 (2d Cir. 2004); In re Credit Suisse First Bos. Corp. (Lantronix, Inc.) Analyst Sec. 
Litig., 250 F.R.D. 137, 137–38 (S.D.N.Y. 2008); In re Credit Suisse-AOL Sec. Litig., 253 F.R.D. 17, 20 
(D. Mass. 2008); DeMarco v. Robertson Stephens Inc., 228 F.R.D. 468, 475 (S.D.N.Y. 2005); LaGrasta 
v. First Union Sec., Inc., No. 2:01-CV-251-FTM29DNF, 2005 WL 1875469, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 8, 
2005); DeMarco v. Lehman Bros., 222 F.R.D. 243, 246–47 (S.D.N.Y. 2004); see also Miles v. Merrill 
Lynch & Co. (In re Initial Pub. Offering Sec. Litig.), 471 F.3d 24, 28 (2d Cir. 2006) (involving claims 
brought against the issuer, individual officers, and underwriters for, among other things, “analyst 
manipulation”).
68. See cases cited supra note 67.
69. See cases cited supra note 67.
70. See Millowitz, 544 F.3d 474; In re Credit Suisse-AOL, 253 F.R.D. 17; In re Bos. Scientific Corp. Sec. 
Litig., 604 F. Supp. 2d 275 (D. Mass. 2009).
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issuers.71 These courts came to this conclusion without examining whether the market 
was efficient with regard to the particular type of information disseminated by a non-
issuer or whether the information actually affected the market price.72 The standard 
set by these courts disregards the necessary examination of the facts and circumstances 
to determine that the presumption can be properly applied. In doing so, courts have 
opened the door to improper application of the presumption and to certification of 
classes that cannot, and should not, meet the requirements of Rule 23.
 In the 2008 decision Millowitz v. Citigroup Global Markets, Inc., the Second 
Circuit became the first circuit to reach the issues of whether the fraud-on-the-
market presumption could be extended to actions against research analysts and what 
evidentiary showing should be required to invoke the presumption.73 The Millowitz 
court considered whether the district court properly applied the presumption in a 
class action by investors against security research analyst Jack Grubman, his employer, 
Salomon Smith Barney, Inc. (SSB), SSB’s sister corporation Citicorp USA, Inc., and 
SSB’s parent, Citigroup, Inc., for misrepresentation.74 The plaintiffs, investors of 
Metromedia Fiber Network, Inc. (“Metromedia”), filed a class action in the U.S. 
District Court for the Southern District of New York against the defendants for 
allegedly violating section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 in a scheme to defraud purchasers 
and sellers of Metromedia stock.75 The plaintiffs contended that the defendants 
misstated or omitted material facts relating to a credit facility provided by Citicorp 
USA to increase its investment banking business with Metromedia and, accordingly, 
Grubman’s personal compensation.76 In December 2000, Metromedia and Citicorp 
USA signed a commitment letter for Citicorp USA to provide a $350 million facility 
to Metromedia.77 Citicorp USA was to underwrite the facility, provide $75 million 
of the credit, and syndicate the remaining amount to other lenders.78 SSB and 
Grubman published research reports in which they opined on the strength of 
Metromedia’s stock.79 To maintain independence, SSB’s policies implemented a 
“Chinese Wall” to shield SSB equity investors from obtaining non-public information 
held by Citicorp USA investment bankers.80 On January 9, 2001, Metromedia 
71. See cases cited supra note 67.
72. See cases cited supra note 67.
73. 544 F.3d at 476; cf. In re Credit Suisse First Bos. Corp. (Lantronix, Inc.) Analyst Sec. Litig., 250 F.R.D. 
137, 141 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (“No Court of Appeals has ever held that the Basic presumption applies to 
research analyst statements.”).
74. Millowitz, 544 F.3d at 476.
75. Id.; In re Salomon Analyst Level 3 Litigation, 350 F. Supp. 2d 477, 481 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
76. Millowitz, 544 F.3d at 476.
77. Id. at 477.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. The complaint contained allegations that Grubman “breached the ‘wall’ on numerous occasions,” 
which the district court found to be sufficient “notwithstanding the many dubious leaps of logic made 
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publicly announced the execution of the commitment letter with Citicorp USA.81 
Over the next several months, the proposed facility faced delays and problems.82 
Despite knowledge of these complications, between March 8 and July 25, 2001, 
Grubman issued reports stating that Metromedia “obtained a commitment for a fully 
underwritten credit facility for $350 million from Citicorp USA, Inc., which it 
expects will fully fund its current business plan.”83 Then, on June 28, Grubman 
expressed some doubt about the facility, indicating that the closing deadline was 
approaching and the deal was not yet complete.84 A month later, Grubman 
downgraded his recommendation to “Neutral” because of continued delays in closing 
the facility and a lack of visibility.85 Ultimately, the facility evolved into a significantly 
different package.86
 In its decision on the plaintiffs’ motion for class certification, the district court 
considered whether the plaintiffs could satisfy the predominance requirement and 
establish reliance through the fraud-on-the-market presumption.87 It noted the 
controversy of the presumption’s applicability to statements made by analysts.88 
Indicating that nothing in the Basic decision limited its holding to issuer statements, 
the district court decided that the presumption applied to the defendants’ statements if 
plaintiffs made an adequate showing that the Basic elements were met.89 The court 
determined that the plaintiffs satisfied their burden because Metromedia stock was 
actively traded on an open, developed, and generally efficient securities market and the 
defendant’s misrepresentations were material and publicly made.90 The court proceeded 
to apply the presumption against the defendants.91 Contesting the application, the 
defendants argued that the plaintiffs were not entitled to the presumption because they 
failed to show that the misstatements regarding the credit facility “actually had an 
effect on the value of Metromedia shares.”92 Rejecting this argument, the court 
conducted no analysis of whether the alleged misrepresentation actually affected the 
by plaintiffs.” Id. (quoting In re Salomon Analyst Metromedia Litig., 373 F. Supp. 2d 235, 240 (S.D.N.Y. 
2005)) (internal quotation mark omitted).
81. In re Salomon Analyst, 373 F. Supp. 2d at 240.
82. Id. at 239.
83. Millowitz, 544 F.3d at 477 (quoting In re Salomon Analyst, 373 F. Supp. 2d at 239) (quotation marks 
omitted).
84. In re Salomon Analyst, 373 F. Supp. 2d at 239.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. In re Salomon Analyst Metromedia Litig., 236 F.R.D 208, 220 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
88. Id.
89. See id.
90. Id. at 222.
91. See id.
92. Id. at 223. 
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market price of the security.93 It declined to allow the defendants to present their 
rebuttal arguments prior to certification because doing so would require inquiry into 
the merits of the suit, which precedent from the Second Circuit Court of Appeals 
prohibited.94 At conclusion of the hearing, the court certified the class.95
 Subsequently, defendants appealed to the Second Circuit.96 The Second Circuit 
addressed the issue of whether the plaintiffs were entitled to the presumption and 
whether a heightened standard should be adopted in claims against analysts for 
misrepresentation.97 The court affirmed the lower court’s application of the 
presumption, but vacated the order and remanded the request for certification to 
allow the defendants an opportunity to present a rebuttal.98 The court held that the 
fraud-on-the-market presumption may be invoked by a class of investors in an action 
alleging misrepresentations made not only research analysts, but by “anyone else.”99 It 
reasoned that, in an efficient market, share prices ref lect all public information, 
including any material misrepresentations made by “an issuer, an analyst, or anyone 
else.”100 The court concluded that mere fulfillment of the Basic elements was sufficient 
to justify application of the presumption and that a heightened test was unnecessary 
despite the qualitative differences between statements made by issuers and non-
issuers.101 Thus, the court stated that plaintiffs were not required to show that the 
alleged misstatement caused a change in the stock price; nor did plaintiffs need to 
prove that the alleged misstatement had any effect on the market.102 The plaintiffs 
were not required to make any showing that an alleged misstatement, which could be 
made by anyone, was even the type of information that could be incorporated into the 
93. See id. The court recognized that some courts have held in cases against analysts that plaintiffs must 
make a prima facie showing that the alleged misstatements “materially and measurably impacted the 
market price of the security.” Id. (quoting DeMarco v. Lehman Bros., 222 F.R.D. 243, 247 (S.D.N.Y. 
2004)). The district court, however, declined to adopt this standard. Id.
94. See id.; see also Caridad v. Metro-North Commuter R.R., 191 F.3d 283, 293 (2d Cir. 1999) (determining 
that “district courts must not consider or resolve the merits of the claims of the purported class”).
95. In re Salomon Analyst, 236 F.R.D. at 224.
96. Millowitz v. Citigroup Global Mkts., Inc. (In re Salomon Analyst Metromedia Litig.), 544 F.3d 474, 
479–80 (2d Cir. 2008).
97. Id. at 476.
98. Id. at 484–86. The Court of Appeals found that the district court erred by declining to allow the 
defendants to present their rebuttal arguments prior to class certification. Id. It stated that Caridad, 191 
F.3d at 293, and the “some showing” standard of proof it set forth, was overruled. Millowitz, 544 F.3d 
at 484. The court required a “definitive assessment” by district courts to determine that the predominance 
requirement was met. Id. (quoting Miles v. Merrill Lynch & Co. (In re Initial Pub. Offering Sec. Litig.), 
471 F.3d 24, 41 (2d Cir. 2006)). Defendants’ rebuttal arguments must be heard prior to class certification. 
Id. at 485.
99. Millowitz, 544 F.3d at 481 (emphasis added).
100. Id.
101. See id. at 481–84.
102. See id. at 482–83.
1133
nEW yOrK LaW sChOOL LaW rEViEW VOLUME 55 | 2010/11
stock price.103 The court did not explore the possibility that information disseminated 
by analysts and other non-issuers is not absorbed by the market. Instead, it established 
a standard that allows a plaintiff to invoke the presumption in an action against a 
non-issuer without a proper assessment of the facts and circumstances to determine 
whether the presumption should apply.
 As of the date of this writing, no other circuit court has ruled on the applicability 
of the fraud-on-the-market presumption to analysts. However, a federal district court 
in Massachusetts has taken a similar position to that of the Second Circuit. In In re 
Credit Suisse-AOL Securities Litigation, the District Court of Massachusetts considered 
certification of a class of investors in an action against Credit Suisse First Boston, 
Inc., its subsidiary, and two of its employed research analysts.104 The plaintiffs alleged 
the defendants issued a series of research reports in which they touted the stock of 
AOL Time Warner, Inc. (AOL) without revealing their knowledge of adverse 
information about the company.105 The plaintiffs claimed that the defendants were 
motivated to issue false and misleading reports to win AOL’s lucrative investment 
banking work.106 The defendants argued that, “because analyst statements are 
qualitatively different from issuer statements,” the application of the Basic framework 
should be conditioned on an additional showing that the analyst reports impacted 
AOL’s market price.107 Noting that the First Circuit Court of Appeals had not yet 
addressed the applicability of the presumption to analysts, the district court 
acknowledged the distinction between issuer and analyst statements in the DeMarco 
v. Lehman Brothers, Inc. decision:
[T]here is a qualitative difference between a statement of fact emanating from 
an issuer and a statement of opinion emanating from a research analyst. A 
well-developed efficient market can reasonably be presumed to translate the 
former into an effect on the price, whereas no such presumption attaches to 
the latter. . . . As a result, no automatic impact on the price of a security can 
be presumed and instead must be proven and measured before the statement 
can be said to have “defrauded the market” in any material way that is not 
simply speculative.108
The court stated that proving that a particular statement was material and had an 
impact on a stock’s market price may be more difficult for statements made by 
analysts than for those made by issuers.109 Nonetheless, the court concluded that the 
103. See id. at 480–84.
104. 253 F.R.D. 17, 19 (D. Mass. 2008). For a detailed recitation of the facts, see In re Credit Suisse-AOL 
Sec. Litig., 465 F. Supp. 2d 34 (D. Mass. 2006).
105. In re Credit Suisse-AOL, 253 F.R.D. at 19–20.
106. Id. at 20.
107. Id. at 28.
108. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting DeMarco v. Lehman Bros., 222 F.R.D. 243, 246–47 (S.D.N.Y. 
2004)).
109. Id. at 29.
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identity of the speaker should not alter the legal or analytical framework.110 It 
reasoned that nothing in Basic required a showing of market impact even though 
Basic only addressed misstatements made by issuers.111
 Furthermore, the court feared that it would inquire too far into the merits of the 
issues to determine whether a misstatement actually affected the stock price.112 It 
argued that to require the plaintiff to show more than market efficiency at the 
certification stage “would conflate the issue of whether common issues will dominate 
the merits decision with the merits decision itself.”113 The court asserted that the 
defendants’ arguments regarding market impact did not address the purposes of Rule 
23 and that to engage those arguments would drag the court into an “unwieldy trial 
on the merits.”114 Ultimately, the court held that the defendants would be allowed to 
show the lack of a market impact in a rebuttal against the presumption, but that this 
right would not be afforded to them until trial.115
 A more recent decision by the district court of Massachusetts reached the same 
conclusions as the Credit Suisse court.116 This time the district court again accepted 
the argument that an analysis beyond a showing of market efficiency would 
unnecessarily drag the court too far into merit-based issues.117 In In re Boston Scientific 
Corp. Securities Litigation, the court held that the issue of whether the fraud-on-the-
market theory can be applied to a class action should not be determined until after 
certification.118 It stated, “[a] plaintiff seeking class certification in the First Circuit 
need only ‘present basic facts that the fraud-on-the-market presumption could be 
invoked,’ while the theory’s actual applicability should be resolved on summary 
judgment or trial.”119 Thus, the court presumed that the plaintiffs relied on the 
misstatement before determining whether the presumption’s applicability was proper 
with the knowledge that it might be refuted at trial.120 It expressly declined the 
Second Circuit’s approach of providing defendants an opportunity to present a 
rebuttal at class certification.121
110. Id.
111. Id. 
112. Id. at 30.
113. Id. (quoting DeMarco v. Robertson Stephens Inc., 228 F.R.D. 468, 475 (S.D.N.Y. 2005)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted).
114. Id. (quoting Bowe v. PolyMedica Corp. (In re PolyMedica Corp. Sec. Litig.), 432 F.3d 1, 17 (1st Cir. 
2005)) (internal quotation mark omitted).
115. Id. at 30 n.15.
116. See In re Bos. Scientific Sec. Litig., 604 F. Supp. 2d 275, 286–88 (D. Mass. 2009).
117. See id.
118. See id. at 287.
119. Id. at 286 (quoting Brown v. Am. Honda (In re New Motor Vehicles Can. Exp. Antitrust Litig.), 522 
F.3d 6, 25 (1st Cir. 2008)).
120. See id.
121. Id. at 287.
1135
nEW yOrK LaW sChOOL LaW rEViEW VOLUME 55 | 2010/11
 Although the Second Circuit refused to hold plaintiffs to a heightened standard 
to invoke the presumption in actions against non-issuers, it provided defendants an 
opportunity to challenge the application before certification. Defendants could rebut 
plaintiffs’ proof of the elements by “[a]ny showing that severs the link between the 
alleged misrepresentation and . . . the price.”122 But the District Court of Massachusetts 
has taken the position that defendants may not contest the presumption prior to 
certification.123 Thus, the district court declined to hold plaintiffs to a heightened 
standard and denied defendants a right to rebuttal at certification.124
iV.  thE brOad appLiCatiOn Of thE Basic fraMEWOrK: thE COnsEqUEnCEs 
Of trEating appLEs and OrangEs as thE saME
 The issue of whether the fraud-on-the-market doctrine can be invoked in class 
actions against analysts for public misrepresentations and omissions is of particular 
significance because investors, as a class, cannot satisfy the reliance requirement if 
the doctrine is not applied.125 If reliance cannot be presumed or proven, investors as 
a class cannot recover for legitimate losses suffered as a result of material 
misrepresentations and omissions transmitted by the defendants.126 Thus, investors 
may have no redress for their investment losses resulting from faulty, misleading 
recommendations made by analysts solely to further their own self-interests.127
 In the financial research industry, conflicts of interest between retail brokerages 
and research analysts are commonplace.128 Research analysts play an important role 
in securities markets.129 They acquire information about a security that is publicly 
available and generated from their own research.130 They then analyze and transmit 
the information to provide coverage on a stock to the marketplace.131 In addition, 
analysts provide recommendations and ratings on securities.132 Conducting research 
122. Millowitz v. Citigroup Global Mkts., Inc. (In re Salomon Analyst Metromedia Litig.), 544 F.3d 474, 
484 (2d Cir. 2008) (quoting Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 248 (1988)).
123. See In re Bos. Scientific, 604 F. Supp. 2d 275, 286 (D. Mass. 2009); In re Credit Suisse-AOL Sec. Litig., 
253 F.R.D. 17, 19 (D. Mass. 2008).
124. In re Credit Suisse-AOL, 253 F.R.D. at 30.
125. See Basic, 485 U.S. at 228–30 (1988).
126. See id. at 243 (stating that “[w]e agree that reliance is an element of a Rule 10b-5 cause of action”).
127. An investor may pursue a direct claim in his or her individual capacity, however, individual losses are 
often too small to pursue the high litigation costs. E.g., In re Bos. Scientific Corp. Sec. Litig., 604 F. 
Supp. 2d 275 (D. Mass. 2009).
128. See 3 Harold S. Bloomenthal & Samuel Wolff, Securities and Federal Corporate Law 
§ 1:196 (2d ed. 2010); 5 Thomas Lee Hazen, Law of Securities Regulation § 14.16[6] (6th ed. 
2009 & Supp. 2010).
129. See DeMarco v. Lehman Bros., 222 F.R.D. 243, 246 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
130. Fisch, supra note 2, at 46.
131. Id.
132. DeMarco, 222 F.R.D. at 246.
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and generating information is costly.133 The problem that analysts face is that the 
information they produce can easily become a public good.134 If analysts sold the 
information they produce, the value of the information can dissipate quickly because 
it is easily transferrable from investors who purchased the information to other 
investors who paid nothing.135 Consequently, analysts are constrained to subsidize 
their research and depend on brokerage firms and investment banks.136 Because these 
arrangements often involve some linkage between the analyst’s compensation or 
funding and the subsidizer’s success, conflicts of interest develop.137 A conflict of 
interest, for example, will arise if an analyst works for a firm that has investment 
banking or other business relationships with issuers of the securities recommended 
by the analyst.138 Such conf licts put pressure on analysts to publish favorable 
recommendations about a stock to generate business or commissions for the subsidizer 
despite contrary beliefs analysts may have about the merits of an investment in the 
stock.139 A recommendation, made without a reasonable basis and for the purpose of 
enhancing personal investments, increasing compensation, or furthering any other 
self-interest without disclosure of such interest, is improper and impermissible.140
 As a result of an analyst’s misleading recommendation or statement, investors 
may suffer significant losses. Investors can recover their losses in an action for fraud 
if they can establish reliance.141 If investors bring a class action against an analyst, 
reliance can be established only by presumption under the fraud-on-the-market 
doctrine.142 The doctrine prescribes that reliance may be presumed on a publicly 
133. See Fisch, supra note 2, at 48.
134. Id. at 47.
135. Id. at 48.
136. Id. at 48–49.
137. Id. at 55–66.
138. 14B Guy P. Lander, U.S. Securities Law for International Financial Transactions and 
Capital Markets § 13:263 (2d ed. 2009).
139. Bloomenthal, supra note 7, § 9:2.
140. 5 Hazen, supra note 128, § 14.16[6]. An analyst who receives compensation or other benefit for making 
recommendations and fails to disclose the self-interest may be accountable pursuant to section 17(b) of the 
Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77q(b) (2006 & Supp. IV 2010). 5 Hazen, supra note 128, § 14.17. 
Section 17(b) applies to any person making a recommendation who receives undisclosed consideration 
directly or indirectly by the person or entity disseminating the information. Id. Further, an analyst who 
purchases stock and subsequently issues a buy recommendation on that same stock to intentionally boost 
the stock price and gain a profit commits the fraudulent practice of scalping. Id. The U.S. Supreme Court 
has held that failure to disclose the intention to scalp to clients or anyone else who is likely to rely on the 
recommendation is a violation of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-1 to 80b-21 
(2006 & Supp. IV 2010). 5 Hazen, supra note 128, § 14.17 (citing SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, 
Inc., 375 U.S. 180 (1963)). In addition, failure to disclose scalping may be a violation of Rule 10b-5 as a 
prohibited material misstatement or omission in connection with the purchase or sale of securities. Id.
141. Millowitz v. Citigroup Global Mkts., Inc. (In re Salomon Analyst Metromedia Litig.), 544 F.3d 474, 
478, 478 n.1 (2d Cir. 2008).
142. See supra Part II. This statement assumes that the analyst owed no duty to the aggrieved investors. 
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made material misrepresentation about a stock that is incorporated into the price of 
the stock.143 But although recommendations made by some analysts can affect market 
prices,144 recommendations by other analysts—for example, those who may carry 
weak reputations or are known to have conflicts of interest—do not affect or have 
little effect on market prices.145
 There is public recognition that analysts’ reports tend to be inaccurately 
optimistic.146 The market discounts information that emanates from analysts with 
conflicts of interest who are potentially biased.147 Studies show there is a limited 
market response to favorable buy recommendations issued by analysts affiliated with 
investment banks and a lower response to opinions that upgrade than those that 
downgrade a stock.148 Professors Anup Agrawal and Mark A. Chen conducted a 
study to examine whether investors are misled by optimistic stock recommendations 
issued by analysts with conflicts of interest.149 They analyzed a sample of over 110,000 
stock recommendations issued by over 4000 analysts between 1994 and 2003 and 
examined potential conflicts based on the revenues of analyst employers.150 They 
found that the recommendations were positively related to the magnitude of conflicts 
analysts faced.151 Evidence of stock price and trading volume reactions to 
recommendations by analysts suggested that the market recognizes conf licts of 
interest and discounts opinions.152 They concluded that analysts with conflicts of 
interest are not able to systematically mislead investors with optimistic stock 
recommendations.153
143. See supra Part II.
144. DeMarco v. Lehman Bros., 222 F.R.D. 243, 246 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
145. Fisch, supra note 2, at 65–66.
146. 3 Bloomenthal & Wolff, supra note 128, § 13.31.
147. See Fisch, supra note 2, at 66.
148. See id.
149. Anup Agrawal & Mark A. Chen, Do Analyst Conflicts Matter? Evidence from Stock Recommendations, 51 
J.L. & Econ. 503 (2008).
150. Id. at 504, 509.
151. Id. at 531.
152. Id. Professors Agrawal and Chen stated:
Consistent with the view of the media and regulators, we find that optimism in stock 
recommendations is positively related to the importance of both [investment banking] 
and brokerage businesses to an analyst’s employer. . . . [S]everal pieces of empirical 
evidence . . . suggest that investors are sophisticated enough to adjust for this bias. First, 
the short-term reactions of both stock prices and trading volumes to recommendation 
upgrades vary negatively with the magnitude of potential [investment banking] or 
brokerage conflicts faced by analysts. . . . These results suggest that investors ascribe 
lower credibility to an analyst’s upgrade when the analyst is subject to greater pressures 
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 In contrast, statements made by the issuer of the security are viewed differently 
by the market.154 It is hard to conceive that information transmitted by issuers have 
the same effect on the market as those made by analysts and other parties. “The key 
distinction between the statements of issuers and those of analysts cited by defendants 
in these cases is that the former are ‘uniquely authoritative’ while the latter are 
‘expressions of opinion.’”155 Statements made by issuers are “relatively fixed, certain, 
and uncontradicted.”156 Conversely, statements of opinion made by analysts are “far 
more subjective and far less certain.”157 Unlike issuers, analysts do not have a general 
duty to the market; nor are they required to abide by extensive SEC reporting rules.158 
Moreover, when a research report is injected into a pool of information that includes 
opinions from multiple analysts and varying sources, it is likely to dissipate and have 
little effect on the stock price.159
 Basic established the presumption of reliance to deal with repeated issuer 
misstatements about a material fact.160 In light of the special authority an issuer has 
on matters pertaining to its publicly traded stock, the Supreme Court concluded as a 
matter of “common sense and probability” that such misstatements affected the stock 
price.161 The issue therefore is whether the Basic framework, if used in actions against 
analysts, should allow application of the presumption to all statements by analysts, or 
only to those analysts whose recommendations affected the market price.
 Based on the foregoing research, however, the Basic framework is too broad when 
used in actions brought by investors against research analysts for misrepresentation. 
Extending the Basic framework to these actions would allow investors to presume 
reliance on analysts’ statements even when their misstatements may be unlikely to 
affect the stock market price. A class could then be certified under the fraud-on-the-
market theory even though the market may have disregarded the information and, as 
a result, investors may not have relied on the alleged misstatement. Only in a case in 
which the misleading recommendation affected the stock price would it be fair to 
presume reliance under the fraud-on-the-market doctrine.162
154. See, e.g., McLaughlin, supra note 27, § 5:26.
155. Sarah S. Gold & Richard L. Spinogatti, Fraud-on-the-Market Use for Analysts’ Claims is Battle, N.Y. L.J., 
Apr. 9, 2008, at 3 (quoting Hevesi v. Citigroup Inc., 366 F.3d 70, 79 (2d Cir. 2004)).
156. DeMarco v. Lehman Bros., 222 F.R.D. 243, 246 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
157. Id. at 247.
158. Karmel, supra note 32, at 27, 46.
159. McLaughlin, supra note 27, § 5:26; John C. Coffee Jr., Causation and the Analyst, N.Y. L.J., July 15, 2004, 
at 5 (“The context of analyst litigation is different than that of . . . issuer statements generally, because there 
is seldom any corrective disclosure by the analyst. Rather, the inflated price may erode slowly as other 
analysts release different opinions or the issuer releases new information.”); In re Credit Suisse First Bos. 
Corp. Analyst Sec. Litig., 250 F.R.D. 137, 142 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (stating, when characterizing defendants’ 
argument, that “analyst statements are, at least in some respects, different from those of issuers”).
160. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 228–30 (1988).
161. Id. at 246.
162. See DeMarco, 222 F.R.D. at 247.
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 Extension of the presumption can lead to significant consequences because it 
exposes new classes of defendants to civil liabilities by private parties.163 Even the 
Second Circuit recognized the broad impact of extending the fraud-on-the-market 
doctrine to analysts prior to its decision in Millowitz. In Hevesi v. Citigroup, Inc., the 
court noted that the application of the fraud-on-the-market doctrine to research 
analysts presented a “novel” and “significant” issue because it would “extend the 
potentially coercive effect of securities class actions to a new group of corporate and 
individual defendants—namely, to research analysts and their employers. . . . [It is] 
an issue that is ‘of fundamental importance to the development of the law of class 
actions.’”164 Further, the court expressed in Miles v. Merrill Lynch & Co. that it was 
“doubtful whether the Basic presumption can be extended, beyond its original 
context, to tie-in trading, underwriter compensation, and analysts’ reports.”165
 The Supreme Court has warned that expanding the presumption to expose new 
classes of defendants to liability in a private cause of action can lead to significant 
consequences.166 As a result of the standard set by the Second Circuit and the District 
Court of Massachusetts, analysts face lengthy trials and loss of considerable resources 
when investors have not shown the alleged misstatement was significant enough to 
distort the market price. Once a class is certified, the defendant’s possible exposure 
to liability is multiplied exponentially.167 Even if the court provides opportunity for 
rebuttal before certification, defendants must hire experts, gather empirical evidence, 
and obtain legal representation. The pressure on defendants to settle is extreme.168 In 
Stoneridge Investment Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlantic, Inc., the Supreme Court 
cautioned “that extensive discovery and the potential for uncertainty and disruption 
in a lawsuit allow plaintiffs with weak claims to extort settlements from innocent 
companies.”169 In securities class actions, plaintiffs typically seek massive damages.170 
163. See Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 159–64 (2008).
164. 366 F.3d 70, 80 (2d Cir. 2004) (quoting Sumitomo Copper Litig. v. Credit Lyonnaise Rouse, Ltd. (In re 
Credit Lyonnaise Rouse), 262 F.3d 134, 140 (2d Cir. 2001)). In Hevesi, the Court of Appeals never 
opined on what evidentiary standard the plaintiffs must satisfy to prompt the presumption because the 
parties settled the suit. Fogarazzao v. Lehman Bros., 232 F.R.D. 176, 184 n.66 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
165. (In re Initial Public Offering Sec. Litig.), 471 F.3d 24, 42 (2d Cir. 2006).
166. See Stoneridge, 552 U.S. at 159–64.
167. Theodore J. Sawicki & Alex Reid, The New Focus on Class Certification of Securities Class Actions, in 27 
Alston & Bird LLP, Securities Litigation: Forms and Analysis § 1:8 (2009). 
168. Id.; see In re Credit Suisse-AOL Sec. Litig., 253 F.R.D. 17, 22 (D. Mass. 2008) (noting the danger of 
“plaintiffs to unfairly bully defendants into settling ‘non-meritorious cases in an effort to avoid both risk 
of liability and litigation expense’” (quoting Brown v. Am. Honda (In re New Motor Vehicles Can. Exp. 
Antitrust Litig.), 522 F.3d 6, 8 (1st Cir. 2008))).
169. 552 U.S. at 163.
170. Sawicki & Reed, supra note 167 (“[M]any corporate executives are unwilling to bet the company that they 
are in the right in big stakes litigation, and a grant of class certification can propel the stakes of a case into 
the stratosphere.” (quoting Blair v. Equifax Check Servs., Inc., 181 F.3d 832, 834 (7th Cir. 1999))).
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Although the plaintiffs may have weak positions, the possibility of an adverse jury 
verdict may not be one a defendant is willing to risk.171
 The lasting effects of the presumption are over-deterrence and increased 
litigation.172 During the period after the Basic decision, securities fraud class-action 
lawsuits almost tripled.173 In a study conducted on a sample of 330 securities fraud 
class-action lawsuits occurring from 1988 through 1991, ninety-six percent were 
resolved through settlement while the norm for most other civil cases was sixty to 
seventy percent.174 Extension of the fraud-on-the-market doctrine to claims against 
any party, whether issuer or non-issuer, may result in litigation multiple times the 
current level. The effects are significantly larger class actions and potential damages 
under Rule 10b-5.175 The presumption facilitates an extraordinary aggregation of 
claims, a process encouraged by attorneys who may stand to gain twenty-five to 
thirty-five percent of the recovery.176 Every investor who purchased the stock during 
the time the alleged misrepresentation caused an inflation or deflation in the stock 
price and held the stock until after the truth was revealed has a cause of action.177 
Shareholder class actions can then act as an insurance policy against legitimate 
171. Id.
172. Frederick C. Dunbar & Dana Heller, Fraud on the Market Meets Behavioral Finance, 31 Del. J. Corp. L. 
455, 529–30 (2006).
173. Id. at 529 (citing Vincent E. O’Brien, The Class-Action Shakedown Racket, Wall St. J., Sep. 10, 1991, at 
A20).
The class-action securities-fraud suit has become a feature of doing business for just 
about every size and type of company in the U.S. Since 1988, the number of these suits 
filed in federal courts has almost tripled. In the past three years, at least one out of 
every 14 companies on the Big Board has experienced a securities-fraud suit, most of 
them alleging concealment or failure to disclose information, and claiming significant 
monetary damages.
 O’Brien, supra.
174. O’Brien, supra note 173. In all of the cases in the study, the “plaintiffs alleged material misrepresentations 
and omissions by management regarding the true health . . . of the defendant company.” Only three 
cases were decided by a jury and five were dismissed or withdrawn. All of the others were settled out of 
court. Id.
175. A.C. Pritchard, Stoneridge Investment Partners v. Scientific-Atlanta: The Political Economy of Securities 
Class Action Reform, 2007–08 Cato Supreme Ct. Rev. 217, 221 (2008).
[T]he combination of the potential for enormous judgments and the cost of litigating 
securities class actions means that even weak cases may produce a settlement if they are 
not dismissed at the complaint stage. The deterrent effect of class actions is thus diluted, 
because both wrongful and innocent conduct is punished. This possibility of extracting 
multimillion dollar settlements from strike suits has driven post-Basic efforts to rein in 
securities class actions.
 Id. at 227.
176. Karmel, supra note 32, at 27; see also Oscar Private Equity Invs. v. Allegiance Telecom, Inc., 487 F.3d. 
261, 266–67 (5th Cir. 2007).
177. Cf. Oscar Private Equity Invs., 487 F.3d. at 261, 267.
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losses.178 As a result of over-deterrence, analysts and other reporters will be 
discouraged from revealing justifiable positive information in fear that they will be 
penalized for not disclosing minute negative facts.179
V. thE KEy tO prOpEr appLiCatiOn: a hEightEnEd standard
 Before reliance by a class of investors can be presumed in actions against research 
analysts and other non-issuers for a public misrepresentation or an omission of a 
material fact, a court must determine in each case whether applying the fraud-on-
the-market presumption is appropriate. Applying the Basic framework is insufficient 
to make this determination. Basic established that, to trigger the presumption against 
an issuer, plaintiffs who traded the stock between the time the misrepresentation was 
made and the truth was revealed must meet a three-prong test, demonstrating that 
the defendants: (1) “publicly made (2) a material misrepresentation (3) about stock 
traded on an . . . efficient . . . market.”180 This standard is inadequate in actions 
against non-issuers because the market is less likely to incorporate misstatements 
transmitted by non-issuers than those made by issuers.181 In other words, under the 
Basic framework, no consideration is given to whether the market is efficient to the 
particular type of information that was misrepresented or omitted, or to whether the 
information affected the market for the stock.
 To avoid this inconsistency, courts should require class-action plaintiffs to make 
a higher evidentiary showing than that prescribed in Basic to invoke the presumption 
in cases against analysts and other non-issuers.182 In addition to the Basic elements, 
plaintiffs should also be required to show that (1) the market is efficient with regards 
to the particular type of information misstated by the defendants, and (2) the 
misrepresentation caused a material distortion in the stock price. This section will 
outline why these elements should be applied and the proper analysis courts should 
undertake when applying them.
 A. Rule 23 Requires a Factually Sensitive Inquiry at Class Certification
 Courts must determine that the underlying theory of the presumption pertains to 
the particular facts and circumstances in each case at class certification. As discussed 
in Part III, some courts presume reliance without first determining whether 
178. See Dunbar & Heller, supra note 172, at 531. If courts applied a heightened standard during class certification, 
they would signal the market that class-action lawsuits are not an insurance scheme against losses. Id.
179. Karmel, supra note 32, at 53; Dunbar & Heller, supra note 172, at 530.
180. Millowitz v. Citigoup Global Mkts., Inc. (In re Salomon Analyst Metromedia Litig.), 544 F.3d 474, 481 
(2d Cir. 2008); see Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 248 (1988).
181. See supra Part III.
182. See Karmel, supra note 32, at 27 (“[S]tatements are made by an issuer in a document required to be filed 
with the SEC, but that such a presumption of reliance should not end the inquiry as to whether such 
reliance was reasonable.”); DeMarco v. Lehman Bros., 309 F.R.D. 243, 245–46 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
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application of the presumption is appropriate.183 At least part of the reason courts are 
disinclined to conduct such an analysis is a misapprehension that the inquiries into 
the merits of the case are not appropriate at class certification.184 However, Congress 
intended courts to fully assess all factual and legal issues before certifying a class 
even if courts must rule on the merits.185 When amending Rule 23 in 2003, the 
Advisory Committee noted that “‘[a] court that is not satisfied that the requirements 
of Rule 23 have been met should refuse certification until they have been met,’ an 
inquiry which may require ‘controlled discovery into the merits, limited to those 
aspects relevant to making the certification decision on an informed basis.’”186 
Accordingly, the Supreme Court has stated that class certification requires a “rigorous 
analysis” and that it “involves considerations that are enmeshed in the factual and 
legal issues comprising the plaintiff ’s cause of action.”187
 Reliance is required to pursue a claim under Rule 10b-5 because it ensures the 
causal connection between the defendant’s conduct and the plaintiff ’s injury.188 As 
the notes to Rule 23(b)(3) indicate, courts must determine whether a case that has 
some commonality of law or fact may nonetheless be unsuited to be treated as a class 
action “if there was material variation . . . in the kinds or degrees of reliance by 
persons to whom they were addressed.”189 “[T]he substantive test for invoking the 
fraud-on-the-market presumption is critical to weeding out cases that are ill-suited 
for class certification.”190 Without a proper assessment of whether the presumption is 
appropriate, plaintiffs can gain an unfair advantage over defendants and use Rule 
10b-5 to establish a scheme of investor’s insurance.191 Thus, a court must make a 
183. See supra Part III.
184. See Caridad v. Metro-North Commuter R.R., 191 F.3d 283, 292 (2d Cir. 1999); Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. 
v. Visa U.S.A. Inc. (In re Visa Check MasterMoney Antitrust Litig.), 280 F.3d 124, 134–35 (2d Cir. 
2001); Laurie B. Smilan, A Basic Truth: Courts Increasingly Require the Rebuttable Fraud-on-the-Market 
Presumption of Reliance Be Fully Established Before Certification of Securities Class Actions, in Practising 
Law Inst., Securities Litigation & Enforcement Institute 2008, at 413, 415 (2008).
185. Miles v. Merrill Lynch & Co. (In re Initial Pub. Offering Sec. Litig.), 471 F.3d 24, 38 (2d Cir. 2006).
186. Matthew L. Mustokoff, Oscar Private Equity Investments v. Allegiance Telecom, Inc.: The Fifth Circuit 
Requires Proof of Loss Causation to Certify Class in Fraud-on-the-Market Case, Sec. Reg. L.J., Fall 2007, 
at 3 (quoting Oscar Private Equity Invs. v. Allegiance Telecom, Inc., 487 F.3d. 261, 267 (5th Cir. 
2007)).
187. Miles, 471 F.3d at 33 (quoting Gen. Tel. Co. of the Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 160 (1982)) (internal 
quotation mark omitted).
188. See List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457, 462 (2d Cir. 1965).
189. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 advisory committee’s note.
190. Brian E. Pastuszenski & Inez H. Friedman-Boyce, Back to Basic—Challenging the Application of the 
Efficient Market Hypothesis in Federal Securities Lawsuits (ALI-ABA Course of Study, Apr. 28–29, 
2005), WL SK080 ALI-ABA 907,933.
191. See List, 340 F.2d at 463; see also Oscar Private Equity Invs. v. Allegiance Telecom, Inc., 487 F.3d. 261, 
265 n.22 (5th Cir. 2007) (“[A]pplying the fraud-on-the-market theory to such complex circumstances 
by rote would yield a victory of habit over reason.”). The advisory committee and the Private Securities 
Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (codified in scattered sections of 15 
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factually sensitive inquiry into the application of the presumption192 and plaintiffs 
cannot maintain a class action unless it is determined that it can be invoked.193
 B. Market Efficiency to the Particular Type of Information
 This section discusses the first of two proposed elements that courts should 
require plaintiffs to satisfy in addition to the Basic test to invoke the presumption of 
reliance. First, plaintiffs must provide evidence that the market is efficient to the 
particular type of information that they allege the defendants misstated.
 Although the Supreme Court required that plaintiffs prove the efficiency of the 
market in which the Basic stock was bought and sold, the Court has never clearly 
defined the concept of an efficient market.194 The Court did provide a hint: a market 
is efficient if it is “open and developed” so that the stock price reflects all publicly 
available information.195 Since Basic, courts have developed and used a number of 
factors to determine whether a stock is traded in an efficient market: (1) the average 
weekly trading volume expressed as a percentage of total outstanding shares; (2) the 
number of securities analysts following and reporting on the stock; (3) the extent to 
which market makers and arbitrageurs trade in the stock; (4) the company’s eligibility 
to file SEC Registration Form S-3; (5) the existence of empirical facts showing a 
cause and effect relationship between unexpected corporate events or financial 
releases and an immediate response in the stock price; (6) the company’s capitalization; 
(7) the bid-ask spread for stock sales; and (8) f loat, the stock’s trading volume without 
insider-owned stock.196 These measures may be indicative of how closely investors 
heed the performance or news updates of a company to make trading decisions. But 
evidence offered to satisfy these factors will not substantiate whether investors give 
the slightest consideration to analyst research reports and other information that is 
not communicated by the issuer when they invest.197 The essence of the fraud-on-
U.S.C.) “recognize that a district court’s certification order often bestows upon plaintiffs extraordinary 
leverage, and its bite should dictate the process that precedes it.” Oscar Private Equity, 487 F.3d at 267.
192. See In re Credit Suisse First Bos. Corp. (Lantronix, Inc.) Analyst Sec. Litig., 250 F.R.D. 137, 143 
(S.D.N.Y. 2008).
193. See Miles, 471 F.3d at 43; see also Smilan, supra note 184, at 415.
194. See Basic, 485 U.S. 224.
195. Id. at 241.
196. See Teamsters Local 445 Freight Div. Pension Fund v. Bombardier, Inc., No. 05 Civ. 1898(SAS), 2006 
WL 2161887, at *6–7 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 1, 2006). Factors one through five (“Cammer factors”) were 
established in Cammer v. Bloom, 711 F. Supp. 1264, 1286 (D.N.J. 1989). See Pastuszenski & Friedman-
Boyce, supra note 190, at 924.
197. Some have even argued that these factors are “only indirect indicia of market efficiency,” and that, “even 
in cases where each of the Cammer factors is [sic] present, . . . an efficient market may not exist. . . . [T]he 
Cammer factors measure conditions exhibited in a market for a particular stock that may be consistent 
with, but do not prove, market efficiency.” Pastuszenski & Friedman-Boyce, supra note 190, at 925. The 
number of security analysts following a stock may be an indication that information about a security will 
more likely be widely dispersed into the public. However, it is not an indication of whether investors will 
rely on information originally released by analysts. Id.
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the-market theory is that the way in which the market processes information justifies 
the investors’ reliance.198 If information is not considered by the investing public, 
then it is not reflected in the stock price.199 Thus, even though plaintiffs can present 
sufficient evidence to meet the above factors, the market may be inefficient with 
regards to the particular type of information alleged to be misleading.200 One circuit 
court recognized that a market may have “information-type inefficiencies”:
[I]t might be that even though the market for the defendant’s shares has been 
demonstrated efficient by the usual indicia, the market is actually inefficient 
with respect to the particular type of information conveyed by the material 
misrepresentation. . . . “[T]he market price of a security will not be uniformly 
efficient as to all types of information.”201
Consequently, evidence of market efficiency that is limited to the factors listed above 
may give little to no assurance that the market incorporates the misrepresentation of 
a non-issuer into the stock price.202
 The financial arrangements between research analysts and investment banks, 
brokerage firms, and financial institutions often result in conflicts of interest where 
analysts are motivated to write optimistic opinions that will generate commissions 
for their employers.203 In fact, studies show that nearly all analyst recommendations 
advise investors to buy.204 As a result, the public approaches information emanated by 
analysts with the expectation that the reports will be biased and optimistic.205 
Investors respond to these conflicts by discounting the information, placing it into 
proper perspective in other ways, or disregarding it when making investment 
decisions.206 Thus, these analyst reports do not typically affect the market price.207 
198. Bowe v. PolyMedica Corp. (In re PolyMedica Corp. Sec. Litig.), 432 F.3d 1, 16 (1st Cir. 2005).
199. See id. at 8.
200. Oscar Private Equity Invs. v. Allegiance Telecom, Inc., 487 F.3d. 261, 269 (5th Cir. 2007).
201. Id. (citation omitted) (quoting Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Good Finance, Bad Economics: 
An Analysis of the Fraud-on-the-Market Theory, 42 Stan. L. Rev. 1059, 1083 (1990)).
202. See Bowe, 432 F.3d at 18–19 (“If the district court had used the definition of market efficiency that we 
adopt today, other factors cited by PolyMedica may have also been relevant to the efficiency analysis and 
may have supported a contrary finding. The district court’s error, therefore, was not in analyzing the 
factors that it did, but in applying an erroneous definition of market efficiency that prevented it from 
analyzing other arguably relevant evidence.”).
203. Fisch, supra note 2, at 45– 66.
204. Id. at 60 (noting that the “SEC reported survey results from 2000 showing that less than 1 percent of all 
analyst recommendations were sell recommendations”).
205. 3 Bloomenthal & Wolff, supra note 128, § 13:31 (“There is widespread recognition among the courts 
that analysts and other securities professionals, if not a large segments [sic] of the public, understand that 
projections and other forward-looking statements are likely to err on the side of optimism.”).
206. Id.; Fisch, supra note 2, at 66 (“[T]he market appears to respond to investment banking and other conflicts 
by discounting information that carries the greatest risk of bias. For example, studies have shown a limited 
market response to buy recommendations issued by investment bank-affiliated analysts, a more significant 
response to recommendation revisions, and a greater response to downgrades than to upgrades.”)
207. John C. Coffee Jr., Security Analyst Litigation, N.Y. L.J., Sept. 20, 2001, at 5.
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To the extent the market accounts for the optimism of these reports, there has been 
no reliance on the information under the efficient market theory.208
 Before applying the presumption in a securities fraud class action against analysts, 
courts should determine whether the market is efficient with regards to information 
disseminated by research analysts regarding the security. Specifically, courts should 
“address and weigh the factors for and against market efficiency.”209 First, courts 
should examine how the information is disseminated into the public and how 
investors obtain the information. Professors Ronald Gilson and Reinier Kraakman 
recognize that the market responds differently to particular kinds of information.210 
They maintain that market efficiency depends upon the availability of the information 
to traders.211 Because the different ways information is distributed make information 
available to varying numbers of investors, Gilson and Kraakman assert that 
information should be categorized into particular “sets” of information rather than as 
information in general.212 “An efficient market response to one information set does 
not necessarily mean that the market will respond efficiently to a different information 
set.”213 They assert that the availability of information is a function of how it is 
disseminated to the market, how many traders are aware of the information, and the 
cost to traders to obtain the information.214 The expense of obtaining, verifying, and 
analyzing information varies from investor to investor.215 Thus, even though a piece 
of information is technically placed into the public domain, it may only be absorbed 
only by a small number of investors.216
 Studies have shown that many types of information relevant to the economic 
health of companies appear to be incorporated into the stock price far more slowly 
and incompletely than suggested by the conventional view of market efficiency.217 
Professor Lynn Stout analogizes the f low of information to the f low of liquid into a 
vessel.218 “How full the vessel gets, and how quickly, depends on both the diameter 
of the channel through which the f luid f lows (how widely the information is 
208. Id.
209. Oscar Private Equity Invs. v. Allegiance Telecom, Inc., 487 F.3d 261, 267 (5th Cir. 2007) (quoting 
Unger v. Amedisys, Inc., 401 F.3d 316, 325 (5th Cir. 2005)) (internal quotation mark omitted).
210. See Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 Va. L. Rev. 549, 
555 (1983) (describing “‘weak,’ ‘semi-strong,’ and ‘strong’ forms as a device for classifying empirical tests 
of price behavior”).
211. Id. at 554.
212. Id. at 558–59.
213. Id. at 559.
214. Id. at 558.
215. Id. at 594–96.
216. Lynn A. Stout, Revisiting the Mechanisms of Market Efficiency: An Introduction to the New Finance, 28 J. 
Corp. L. 635, 652 (2003).
217. Id. at 653.
218. Id. at 656.
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disseminated) and the viscosity of the liquid (how complex, technical, or difficult to 
understand the information may be).”219 Information that is easily grasped and 
distributed into the public may be ref lected in the market price quickly.220 For 
example, press releases about mergers or stock splits and other issuer information 
that is easily retrieved from the various channels of information a corporation might 
regularly use will be ref lected in the stock price instantaneously.221 On the other 
hand, information that is public but difficult to obtain, hard to understand, or 
requires expertise to act upon “may take weeks or months to be fully incorporated 
into prices. . . . [Or it] may never be fully incorporated at all.”222
 By examining how analyst statements are distributed into the public and how the 
information is obtained by investors, the court can better understand how the market 
for the particular security responds to the information. If, for example, the class of 
plaintiffs can demonstrate that information originally released by research analysts is 
typically widely distributed, the market for the security would more likely be efficient. 
A showing that the misstatement’s particular subject matter is easily understood by 
investors would also militate toward market efficiency.
 Plaintiffs can also provide historical evidence that the stock price reacted 
consistently after each time information was released by research analysts. A 
consistent pattern of a particular effect on the price is strong evidence of an efficient 
market. An examination of stock-price activity subsequent to the release of an 
analyst’s statement may also indicate how long after the release the information 
incorporation occurred. A study conducted by Professors Saeyoung Chang and David 
Suk illustrates the feasibility and utility of this analysis.223 They examined stock price 
reactions to an article series in the Wall Street Journal that reported insider trades of 
public companies.224 To examine the efficiency of the market, changes in particular 
stock prices were measured for a period of time after inside trades were reported.225 
They found significant abnormal stock performance accompanied by a significant 
increase in trade volume on publication dates.226 The study revealed that the 
information was incorporated into the stock price and thus the market was efficient 
with regards to the information.227
 Historical price changes to statements that are similar to the alleged misstatement 





223. See id. at 654 (discussing the Chang-Suk study).
224. Saeyoung Chang & David Y. Suk, Stock Prices and the Secondary Dissemination of Information: The Wall 
Street Journal ’s “Insider Trading Spotlight” Column, 33 Fin. Rev. 115, 116 (1998).
225. Id. at 117.
226. Id.
227. See id. at 122.
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related statements.228 For example, a pattern of price movement to statements 
previously made by the same analyst is more compelling evidence than a pattern of 
price changes to statements made by other research analysts. Likewise, information 
within the same subject matter as the misstatement can provide a stronger indication 
of market efficiency over unrelated statements.
 In sum, courts should determine, as an element in their analysis of whether the 
fraud-on-the-market presumption should apply, the efficiency of the market for the 
stock with regards to the particular type of information allegedly misstated by an 
analyst. Understanding how the information is distributed to the public, obtained by 
investors, and incorporated into the stock price historically will better equip a court 
to determine if there was reliance on the misstatement. The analysis will also provide 
insight on whether price changes that occurred subsequent to the misstatement’s 
release were actually caused by the misstatement.
 C. Price Movement
 In addition to the Basic elements and a finding of the market’s efficiency to the 
particular type of information allegedly misstated, reliance should be presumed only 
where the analyst report actually moved the market.229 “Reliance is an indispensable 
element of any fraud claim because it provides the causal connection between a 
defendant’s misrepresentation and a plaintiff ’s injury.”230 Under the fraud-on-the-
market theory, investors are presumed to rely on the integrity of the market price, and 
not merely on the integrity of the market.231 It can be assumed that a misstatement 
made by an issuer of securities affected the stock market price because the issuer 
owes a duty to public investors and is obligated to abide by extensive SEC reporting 
rules.232 The strong credibility and wide dissemination of issuer statements increase 
the likelihood that a misstatement will be incorporated into the price. Moreover, 
issuers should be held to stringent standards because they represent that their SEC 
filings and other disclosures to the public are truthful.233 But where a defendant is a 
secondary party who, unlike an issuer, owes no general duty to investors, there is no 
assurance that the price was affected by his misleading communication.234 Plaintiffs 
228. See Carol R. Goforth, The Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis—An Inadequate Justification for the Fraud-
on-the-Market Presumption, 27 Wake Forest L. Rev. 895, 930 (1992).
229. Coffee, supra note 207, at 5; see also Coffee, supra note 159, at 5; Karmel, supra note 32, at 47– 48. 
230. Greenberg v. Crossroads Sys., Inc., 364 F.3d 657, 663 (5th Cir. 2004) (quoting Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 
485 U.S. 224, 243 (1988)). 
231. See Freeman v. Laventhol & Horwath, 915 F.2d 193, 199 (6th Cir. 1990).
232. Karmel, supra note 32, at 49.
233. Id. at 31.
234. See id. at 49.
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must allege and prove that the fraud affected the market price to establish a causal 
connection.235
 Professor Roberta Karmel asserts that plaintiffs accusing a research analyst of a 
fraudulent misstatement must provide evidence of an impact on the stock price:
Where there is no evidence that a research report directly affected the price of 
a security, not only is there a failure of proof of causation, but it would seem 
anomalous to employ the fraud-on-the-market doctrine to establish reliance. 
If research reports do not affect securities prices, the viability of the ECMH 
would seem to be undermined, and the viability of the fraud-on-the-market 
presumption would seem to be weakened.236
A showing that the alleged misstatement affected the stock price assures that the 
presumption can be properly applied to establish reliance.
 Evidence that the price experienced a material change as a result of the 
misstatement substantiates that there was a substantial likelihood the information 
was important to investors.237 Economists Frederick Dunbar and Dana Heller noted 
that the stock price directly reflects the change in investors’ decisions to trade at a 
given price.238 If certain information causes investors to buy or sell stock at a particular 
price, then the supply-and-demand equilibrium will be disturbed.239 The price will 
rise or fall until demand equals supply.240 Thus, material information causes a material 
rise or fall in the market price of the stock.241 If the impact of the misrepresentation 
on the price was insignificant, then investors did not consider the misstatement 
important.242
 Accordingly, several circuit courts have recognized the significance of market 
price analysis and required plaintiffs to prove the alleged misrepresentation materially 
moved the market to trigger the fraud-on-the-market presumption.243 The Third 
235. DeMarco v. Lehman Bros., 309 F.R.D. 243, 247 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). “[T]he plaintiff must adduce 
admissible evidence that . . . makes a prima facie showing that analyst’s statements alleged to be false or 
fraudulent materially and measurably impacted the market price of the security to which the statements 
relate.” Id. 
236. Karmel, supra note 32, at 46–47.
237. See In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1425 (3d Cir. 1997). 





243. See, e.g., Oscar Private Equity Invs. v. Allegiance Telecom, Inc., 487 F.3d. 261, 265 (5th Cir. 2007); Ray v. 
Citigroup Global Mkts., Inc., 482 F.3d 991, 995 (7th Cir. 2007) (“Under [the fraud-on-the-market 
theory], plaintiffs must show both that the defendants’ alleged misrepresentation artificially inflated the 
price of the stock and that the value of the stock declined once the market learned of the deception.”); 
Bowe v. PolyMedica Corp. (In re PolyMedica Corp. Sec. Litig.), 432 F.3d 1, 18 (1st Cir. 2005) (stating that 
the district court properly included the factor of information effect on stock market prices in its analysis of 
market efficiency); In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1425 (3d Cir. 1997).
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Circuit mandates evidence of an adverse impact on the stock price for a plaintiff to 
meet the materiality element of the misstatement. In In re Burlington Coat Factory 
Securities Litigation, the court held that, because the market for the stock was efficient 
and the misstatement had no effect on the stock price, the information was immaterial 
as a matter of the law.244 Information is material if it would be important to a 
reasonable investor in making a decision to invest in the stock.245 The court reasoned 
that “[i]n the context of an ‘efficient’ market, the concept of materiality translates 
into information that alters the price of the firm’s stock.”246 In an efficient market, 
information that is important to investors is incorporated into the stock price.247 In 
contrast, information that is regarded as unimportant will have no effect, or a 
negligible effect, on the price.248
 In support of this position, the Fifth Circuit stated that, even if a misstatement 
was objectively material to an investor, there must be a showing that the culpable 
information was priced.249 Recognizing “the in terrorem power of certification,” the 
Fifth Circuit requires plaintiffs to prove that the alleged misstatement actually moved 
the market to invoke the presumption of reliance.250 The court provided two reasons 
why it cannot be assumed that every objectively material misrepresentation will move 
a stock.251 First, the market may be inefficient to the particular type of information 
and information-type ineff icient, as described in Part V.B.252 Second, a 
misrepresentation may fail to move the market because the market was strong-form 
efficient with respect to that type of information.253 In other words, the misstatement 
was ref lected by the stock price long before the corrective disclosure because of 
insider trading and other market forces.254
 Before its decision in Millowitz, even the Second Circuit noted the importance of 
evidence of price movement in determining whether the fraud-on-the-market 
presumption should apply. In Hevesi, investors of WorldCom alleged the defendant 
analysts’ research reports were “relentlessly positive, but materially false” and written 
to support their investment banking business with the company.255 The Second 
244. 114 F.3d at 1425.
245. Id. at 1425–26.
246. Id. at 1425.
247. Id.
248. Id.
249. Oscar Private Equity Invs. v. Allegiance Telecom, Inc., 487 F.3d 261, 265 (5th Cir. 2007).
250. Id. at 265, 267.
251. Id. at 269.
252. Id. 
253. Id. Strong form efficiency is a form of the Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis that holds that current 
security prices fully ref lect all currently existing information, including information that is not public. 
Jeffrey J. Haas et al., Corporate Finance and Governance 262 (2006). 
254. Oscar, 487 F.3d at 269.
255. Hevesi v. Citigroup Inc., 366 F.3d 70, 74 (2d Cir. 2004).
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Circuit cited Professor John C. Coffee Jr.’s argument that “[o]nly in a case where the 
publication of the [analyst] report clearly moved the market in a measurable fashion 
would the ‘fraud-on-the-market’ doctrine seem fairly applicable.”256
 The decision in In re Credit Suisse First Boston Corp. (Lantronix, Inc.) Analyst 
Securities Litigation is an example of how the analysis on price movement can be 
conducted to determine whether application of the fraud-on-the-market presumption 
is appropriate.257 There, investors alleged the analyst issued research reports to 
support a promise to the company in exchange for underwriting business.258 The 
analyst failed to fully disclose the fact that the initial public offering had “fallen 
f lat.”259 Instead, he recommended the stock despite knowledge of internal memoranda 
that warned the positive rating was unwarranted.260 The defendants argued the 
reliance presumption should not be extended to analyst reports without proof of 
some link between the alleged misstatement and the security price.261 They noted 
they were not aware of any decision certifying a class action where the court did not 
consider any expert evidence of market movement.262 The court agreed with the 
defendants and determined that, because analyst statements differ from those of 
issuers, investors must show the alleged misstatements affected the market to trigger 
the presumption.263
 The district court examined the evidence of price impact immediately after the 
alleged misleading research reports were issued, during the middle of the class 
period, and toward the end of the class period.264 The court considered public 
documents, external general expertise by well-known professionals, and extensive 
expert testimony and reports from the plaintiffs and defendants.265 The evidence 
focused on the movement of the price and accounted for other public information 
about the stock in the market.266 The court found that there were no statistically 
significant abnormal returns following the issuance of the research reports.267 It also 
256. Id. at 79 n.7 (quoting Coffee, supra note 207, at 5) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). As noted in footnote 166, supra, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in Hevesi never opined 
on what evidentiary standard the plaintiffs must satisfy to invoke the presumption because the parties 
settled the suit.
257. 250 F.R.D. 137, 141 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
258. Id. at 138.
259. Id. at 139 (quoting Complaint for Petitioner at 30, In re Credit Suisse First Bos. Corp. (Lantronix, Inc.) 
Analyst Sec. Litig., 250 F.R.D. 137 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (No. 03 Civ. 2467 (LAP)). 
260. Id. at 138.
261. Id. at 141.
262. Id. at 142.
263. Id.
264. Id. at 143–49.
265. Id. at 142, 144, 145.
266. See id. 
267. Id. at 143.
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noted that it was the intervening information about the stock released into the market 
during the two-year class period that caused the stock to drop.268 Therefore, the 
plaintiffs failed to meet their burden to invoke the reliance presumption and to 
demonstrate that each element of Rule 23 was satisfied.269
 To summarize, placing the burden on the plaintiff to prove the misrepresentation 
impacted the market ensures the presumption is properly and fairly applied in class 
actions against non-issuers.270 Disclosures made by publicly held companies are likely 
to be widely disseminated and highly regarded. Investors know that the information 
comes from a source with the best access to information about a stock, that the issuer 
owes a duty to investors, and that the issuer must fulfill SEC reporting and disclosure 
requirements. It is unlikely that information transmitted into the public by analysts 
and other parties will be absorbed by the market in the same way. Evidence that the 
alleged misstatement caused an impact on the stock price closes this gap. Without it, 
there is no assurance that the misstatement was incorporated into the market price 
and was causally connected to the loss investors allege they suffered.
 D. The Burden on Plaintiffs and Other Avenues of Redress
 The burden on plaintiffs to meet the proposed heightened standard is not a heavy 
one. Plaintiffs would need little discovery from defendants because it largely involves 
an empirical judgment and requires proof drawn from public data and public filings.271 
Moreover, plaintiffs must provide extensive expert analysis of the effect of the 
information in proceedings to establish damages later at trial.272 Class-action plaintiffs 
anticipate these demands and are prepared to meet them before they proceed to file 
a claim.
 Studies by experts have become an indispensible element of securities fraud 
claims. Expert testimony is common in the support and opposition of class 
certification.273 A heightened standard that demands greater reliance on expert 
studies and empirical evidence assures that judges do not rubber-stamp class 
certifications. The decision on whether the presumption should apply would more 
likely be based upon a factual analysis and the opinions of experts who are better 
equipped to understand financial markets.274
268. See id. at 145.
269. Id. at 149.
270. See id. 
271. Oscar Private Equity Invs. v. Allegiance Telecom, Inc., 487 F.3d. 261, 269 (5th Cir. 2007). See generally 
Michael J. Kaufman, Expert Witnesses: Securities Cases § 2:16 (2010) (explaining that event 
studies are necessary to determine whether there was market efficiency and material price movement).
272. See, e.g., Oscar, 487 F.3d at 271.
273. Fener v. Operating Eng’rs Constr. Indus. & Misc. Pension Fund, 579 F.3d 401, 405–06, 408–09 (5th 
Cir. 2009) (discussing competing expert testimony in an appeal to a decision denying class certification 
in a securities litigation); McLaughlin, supra note 27, § 3:13.
274. This approach at least partially addresses Justice White’s concerns expressed in his dissent in Basic Inc. 
v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 250 (1988) (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice 
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 Where class-action plaintiffs are unable to make a sufficient showing to invoke 
the presumption, they are not entitled to damages because there is no reliance on the 
misrepresentation. This, however, does not mean that analysts and other non-issuers 
should not be held responsible for culpable or reckless behavior. There are other 
mechanisms to hold them accountable and to deter others from engaging in fraudulent 
acts.275 Plaintiffs are free to engage in a direct civil action against an analyst where 
they can show they actually relied on the alleged misleading analyst report. 
Additionally, the SEC plays a large role in deterring fraud and punishing culpable 
actors.276 Research analysts can face charges for misrepresentations made with scienter 
without any showing of reliance.277 Analysts may face sanctions for failing to comply 
with regulatory standards requiring disclosure of any potential conflicts of interest.278 
There are also disciplinary proceedings that can be filed against analysts associated 
with broker-dealers and SEC enforcement actions against investment banks as aiders 
and abettors.279 Increased dependence on government action to punish wrongdoing 
by research analysts and other parties when reliance is difficult to prove may solve 
the problems resulting from a high level of civil liability.280
Vi. COnCLUsiOn
 The fraud-on-the-market presumption was created as a device to promote 
considerations of fairness, public policy, probability, and judicial economy. 281 To 
ensure that the presumption continues to be used for these purposes, courts must 
tread carefully in determining whether it is appropriate to extend the presumption to 
circumstances different from those under which it was created. The Basic framework 
was created so that a class of investors seeking to recover losses resulting from public 
misrepresentations made by the issuer of their stock could satisfy the requirements 
pursuant to Rule 23 and proceed in a class action. Issuers must satisfy SEC reporting 
White warned against the confusion, contradiction, and the adverse, unintended effects that would 
result from application of the fraud-on-the-market theory. Id. at 251, 252. He argued that “with no staff 
economists, no experts schooled in the ‘efficient-capital-market-hypothesis,’ [and] no ability to test the 
validity of empirical market studies, we are not well equipped to embrace novel constructions of a 
statute based on contemporary microeconomic theory.” Id. at 253. He asserted that courts are “ill suited” 
and “even less equipped” to control the application of the fraud-on-the-market theory. Id. at 263.
275. See Stoneridge Inv. Partners, L.L.C. v. Scientific-Atlantic, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 166 (2008).
276. See, e.g., List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457, 462–63 (2d Cir. 1965) (discussing reliance on disclosure 
and nondisclosure from an insider and proceedings available to the SEC for insider misconduct).
277. See, e.g., SEC v. Johnson, No. 03 Civ. 177, 2006 WL 238998 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 31, 2006).
278. 5 Hazen, supra note 128, § 14.16.
279. Karmel, supra note 32, at 53.
280. Recent reports show that U.S. capital markets have become less competitive than those overseas, in part 
due to litigation levels. Id. at 27. In these circumstances, the national economic interest may outweigh 
the economic interest of a subset of investors who were in the best position to prevent the losses they 
claimed they incurred. Id.
281. Id.; Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 245 (1988); see Millowitz v. Citigroup Global Mkts., Inc. (In 
re Salomon Analyst Metromedia Litig.), 544 F.3d 474, 483 (2d Cir. 2008).
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and disclosure requirements and abide by their general duty to their shareholders to be 
truthful in their representations. Information published by research analysts and other 
secondary parties, who are not under these obligations, is qualitatively and inherently 
different from statements made by issuers. Recommendations and other statements of 
opinion made by analysts are subjective, uncertain, and likely to dissipate into the 
abyss of information, which includes opinions offered by many other analysts. 
Moreover, the market has little or no response to recommendations made by analysts 
who have conflicts of interest because investors discount the information by the risk of 
bias. Thus, if the Basic framework were extended to actions against analysts, investors 
could invoke the presumption of reliance even though the alleged misleading 
recommendation has little or no effect on the market. Presuming reliance on a 
misstatement that had no influence on the market price would be inconsistent with 
the fraud-on-the-market theory because the information was not incorporated into 
the stock price or the information was not actually material to investors.
 A standard that is higher than the test established in Basic is necessary to ensure 
that application of the presumption is consistent with the fraud-on-the-market 
theory. Courts should require plaintiffs to present sufficient evidence that an alleged 
misstatement made by an analyst or other non-issuer defendant was incorporated 
into the stock price before properly applying the presumption. Evidence that (1) the 
market was efficient to the particular type of information alleged to be misrepresented, 
and (2) the misstatement had an impact on the stock price, in addition to meeting 
the Basic elements, would assure that the fraud-on-the-market presumption can be 
properly applied to claims against non-issuers.
 The first additional prong assures that the market for the stock absorbed and 
incorporated the particular type of information that is alleged to have been misleading. 
It calls for an examination of how the misstatement and other similar information 
are disseminated into the public and how investors obtain the information. The 
second additional requirement provides assurance that reliance is presumed only 
when the alleged misstatement actually moved the market price. Only when the 
misleading information influenced the price is there assurance that the misstatement 
caused the loss investors alleged they suffered. To meet the proposed heightened 
standard, the burden on the plaintiffs is not heavy because it largely involves empirical 
evidence that plaintiffs would already need to establish damages at the trial.
 Failure to adopt a heightened standard and properly apply the reliance presumption 
has significant consequences because it affects the determination of who can seek a 
remedy.282 The failure to adopt a standard higher than the Basic test gives investors 
greater leverage to recover from analysts and other non-issuers. Every investor who 
acquired stock during the period the alleged misleading recommendation or 
misstatement was made until the truth was publicly exposed has a cause of action. To 
defendants, the issuance of class certification may mean facing expensive litigation 
282. Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlantic, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 165 (2008).
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costs and a significantly higher risk of large-scale liability.283 Class certification can 
place substantial pressure on defendants to settle plaintiffs’ claims that have little 
likelihood of success and pay for plaintiffs’ losses that were not caused by the 
defendants’ alleged misstatement.284 The effects of the broad expansion of Basic are 
increased litigation, over-deterrence, and reluctance by analysts to reveal justifiable 
positive information. In the end, those effects mean that the fraud-on-the-market 
presumption will no longer be a useful device to promote considerations of fairness, 
public policy, probability, and judicial economy, as it was originally intended.285
283. Sawicki & Reed, supra note 167, § 1:8 (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(f) advisory committee’s note). “An 
order granting certification, on the other hand, may force a defendant to settle rather than incur the 
costs of defending a class action and run the risk of potentially ruinous liability.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(f) 
advisory committee’s note.
284. Id.
285. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 217 (1988).
